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THE PUZZLING POLITICS OF PATENTS
AND INNOVATION POLICY IN MEXICO
Kenneth C Shadlen*
This is a revised version of the paper presented at the conference "Challenges and Opportunities in Mexico," Southern Methodist University,
March 2010. 1 am grateful to Shubha Ghosh for his thoughtful comments
as discussant.

THIS

article focuses on one aspect of Mexico's intellectual property

(IP) system, patents: state-granted rights of exclusion over inventions. Mexico's patent regime has undergone three sets of changes
in the last twenty years, each offering stronger rights of exclusion over
more types of knowledge and information. The first and most critical
change was the introduction of a new patent law in 1991.1 A second
change, specifically regarding pharmaceutical patents, was introduced following legislative debate in the early 2000s. The third set of changes,
which includes a set of measures to integrate patent policy with national
innovation policy and encourages closer ties between public science and
private industry, was also introduced in the early 2000s.
Variation in patent regimes can be considered along three dimensions:
what knowledge can be owned as property, the rights of owners vs. users
of property, and the effective duration of property owners' rights. 2 In
each instance of change in Mexico, policy has consisted of a movement
toward "strengthening" the level of intellectual property rights (IPRs):
offering private rights of exclusion on more types of knowledge, granting
the owners of the private rights more ability to control the use of their
privately owned knowledge, and extending the amount of time that the
private rights endure. The objective of this article is to present and explain this trajectory of persistent strengthening of IPRs. It is a puzzling
outcome simply because the policy orientation has not been successful by
most measures, i.e. the new patent policy has increased the cost of accessing knowledge without sparking increases in innovative activities or
outputs. 3
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1. Ley de Fomnento y Protecci6n de la Propiedad Industrial [L.F.P.P.I] [Industrial
Property Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de Federaci6n [D.O.], 27 de Junio de
1991 (Mex.).
2. Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Mexico: The Industrial
Bases of Health Policies, 42 comp. Pot- 41, 42 (2009).
3. Indeed, in light of these effects other developing countries that also introduced
strong IP systems in the 1990s have revisited-rather than simply reinforced-their
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Prior to explaining the policy trajectory experienced by Mexico, it is
necessary to understand how policy might vary. In the first section, I present the key dimensions of patent policies that allow us to characterize
national patent regimes and thus serve as axes of variation. In the second
section, I examine the initial move toward adopting a patent system that
offers strong rights of exclusion over a wide range of knowledge, and I
offer a brief assessment of the effects of these arrangements. In the third
section, I analyze the politics of compulsory licensing in the area of pharmaceutical patents, and in the fourth section, I examine the contemporary political economy of innovation policy.
I. PATENT POLICIES: PHARMACEUTICALS, PIPELINE
PATENTS, AND COMPULSORY LICENSES
Patents confer limited rights ot exclusion over inventions that are new,
non-obvious, and have industrial use. Although the grant of a patent
constitutes turning knowledge into private property, the subsequent
rights of owners over their property are limited in that they are not automatic, not absolute, and not permanent. Let's examine each limitation in
turn. Patents are granted only where applicants demonstrate that their
inventions satisfy the criteria of patentability. With application and examination central-and prior-to the process of establishing ownership,
governments can control what knowledge becomes private property
within their territory.
Another limitation is that patent rights include various exceptions to
patent-holders' ability to control the use and distribution of their property. Patent regimes include provisions by which third parties can, without requesting permission, use knowledge that is owned by someone else.
They also include provisions that allow third parties to receive permission
from the state to use other actors' privately-owned knowledge in ways
that would otherwise constitute violations of patent-holders' rights.
Lastly, patents expire: at some point the private property enters the pub4
lic domain, where access to and use of the knowledge is unrestricted .
These limitations map onto lines of political conflict over what can be
owned privately, between the rights of owners and users of private property, and over the duration of rights. These lines of conflict, in turn, map
roughly on to axes of policy variation .5 For the purposes of this paper I
will focus on the first two limitations, what sorts of knowledge can be
owned privately and the rights of owners vs. users.
With regard to conflicts over what sort of knowledge can be owned
privately, an important issue is whether countries grant pharmaceutical
patents. 6 Many developing countries did not do so prior to the 1990s. A
earlier measures. See

KENNPI 1 C. SIJADLEN, KNOWLEDGE GAPS, KNOWLEI)GE
TIRAPS? Tim NEW POLITICS OF PATENTS IN I)EVEI.OPMENT (forthcoming).

4.

SIJADLEN,

5. Id.
6. Id. at 6.

supra note 2, at 44.
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second policy issue regards how to deal with inventions that are not new
but that were not patented when they were new because the previous
regime did not allow the sort of knowledge to be patented. If a country
hegan granting pharmaceutical patents in 1995, for example, a drug that
was invented in 1990 would not have been eligible for a patent when it
was new. The novelty requirement would also make the drug unpatentable in 1995, even with the introduction of pharmaceutical patents, because it was no longer new. 7 Since drugs are patented before marketing
authority is secured, the 1990 drug would most likely be undergoing
clinical trials in 1995-it would be in the "pipeline." How do countries
introducing pharmaceutical patents treat drugs in the pipeline? 8
Compulsory licenses (CLs) constitute a key policy area corresponding
to conflicts over the rights of owners vs. users. Patent rights include exceptions to patent-holders' ability to exert control over the use of their
property. CLs allow domestic entities (public or private) to import, produce, and distribute patented goods without the patent-holders' consent. 9
CLs have historically been part and parcel of national patent regimes,
granted by countries in a wide range of situations.
1I.

TRIPS, NAFI'A, AND MEXICAN PATENT POLICY

National IP regimes serve dual purposes, to provide incentives for the
generation and commercialization of innovations and to foster dissemination and use of knowledge. 10 An IP regime alone cannot maximize these
two objectives simultaneously. After all, IP rights generate incentives to
innovate precisely by restricting use, so absent other regulations (competition policy, price controls) a country that establishes IP regulations that
are most geared toward encouraging innovation potentially does so at the
expense of dissemination and use of knowledge.
Countries have typically sought to tailor their IP regimes, setting incentives to achieve different objectives, in line with local capacities and to
satisfy local needs. Historically, diversity in national IP regimes-both
cross-nationally and longitudinally-has corresponded to basic national
characteristics: wealthier countries that have greater higher levels of indigenous innovative capabilities typically offered stronger IPRs than
poorer countries. Indeed, the relationship between income level and extent of IP protection tended to reflect a j-curve. As countries became
more industrialized and thus local actors came to have more abilities to
7. Id.
8. Pipeline patents are problematic on two dimensions. First, they are retroactive
and thus contradict the requirement of "novelty," which is a fundamental pillar of
patent law. Second, the applications are not examined but simply revalidated.
9. SIIAD EN, supra note 2, at 45.
10. Kenneth C. Shadlen, Harmonization, Differentiation, and Development: The Case
of Intellectual Property in the Global Trading System, in KNOWI EDGE IN Trin--. DE_
VILLOPMI 'NT

OF

ISCONOm IFS

INSTIT UTIONAI

CHOICES

UND)ER

(Silvia Sachetti & Roger Sugden eds., 2009); Kirini E. MASKUS,
I'ROPEIRTY RIGIHTS IN THEI GILOBAL 1CONOMY (2000).

GI OBALISA11ON

IMiITILECTUAI
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use cutting-edge knowledge, patent regimes tended to facilitate accessing
knowledge; and, as countries developed more indigenous innovative capabilities their patent regimes tended to emphasize incentives for knowledge-generation. 1 I
Mexico conforms to the general pattern, observable in most developing
countries, of reducing the level of IP in the post-war period as part of the
industrialization strategy. In the mid-1970s the Mexican patent regime
was adjusted to facilitate local actors' abilities to access and use knowledge. A wide range of types of inventions were declared unpatentable
(e.g. pharmaceuticals and chemicals), patents when granted did not endow owners with strong rights of exclusion, and patent terms were short.
The key measures here are laws on technology transfer and the 1976 Patent Law.' 2
During the 1980s, in the wake of the debt crisis and as part of the
broader process of economic reform to alter the terms of Mexico's integration into the global economy, Mexico's patent regime underwent
changes that reversed the reforms introduced in the 1970s. In 1987, during the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88), Mexico introduced reforms to the new patent law that, among other things,
promised to introduce pharmaceutical patents in ten years (i.e. from
1997).
A key thing to remember, of course, is that the 1980s was also a time
that the United States began using a wide array of instruments to compel
countries to offer more and stronger IPRs (e.g. make pharmaceuticals
patentable, eliminate or at least restrict compulsory licensing clauses, increase terms of patent protection). The central instrument was conditioning access to the U.S. market on changed IP policies, with the IP-trade
linkage built into the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and a key
part of U.S. negotiating strategy at the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations. Although the 1987 reformed LIM appeared from
Mexican perspective to mark a dramatic shift in policy, the measures
nonetheless left Mexico far from the international practices that the
United States was pushing for at the time. Mexico thus came under considerable pressure to implement further changes-in fact the external
pressures were greater after the 1987 reform than before.
Specifically, the key instrument of leverage that the United States applied on Mexico was the removal of preferential market access delivered
through the GSP scheme and the promise to make this market access
11.

See COMM'N ON INTEL LE~CTUAL PROP. RIGHIS, INTEGRATrING INTI'LLECUUAI.
PRoPIi-Y RIGHTS AMNDDriviSLOPMIENr Poiicy 18, 22 (3rd ed. 2003) (2002); see
also Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 NYU J. oi- INr'i- L. & Pot.. 29 (1997);
Shadlen, supra note 10; Maskus, supra note 10.

12. Ley Sobre el Registro de ]a Transferencia de Tecniologia y el Uso y Explotaci6n de
Patentes y Marcas, Dianao Oficial de Federaci6n [D.O.], 30 de Diciembre de 1972
(Mex.); Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, Diario Oficial de Federaci6n [D.O.I, 10 de
Febrero de 1976 (Mex.).
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more stable by converting GSP into a reciprocal trade agreement. Mexico's GSP privileges were suspended on the grounds that the reformed
patent law remained inadequate. The United States was pushing Mexico
to implement a new patent regime in line with what was being debated in
the Uruguay Round and would eventually become the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), even
while the TRIPS negotiations were still far from complete. When President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) later approached the United
States to negotiate NAFTA, the United States made it clear that negotiations would not begin until Mexico first introduced a TRIPS-like patent
system. In 1991, the initiative for a new Law for the Development and
Protection of Industrial Property (LFPPI) was submitted to congress and
passed-largely unaltered-by both the Mexican Senate and Chamber of
Deputies extraordinarily quickly.' 3
The politics of this first period of policy change are rather straightforward in that increased IP was part of the price that Mexico would pay for
the secured market access that the Salinas government sought to procure
with NAFTFA. With that said, the IP reforms were hardly regarded as a
"4sacrifice" or "price" by the Salinas government, which was on a crusade
to open the Mexican economy, and in that sense the United States was
pushing on an open door.' 4 At the same time, the promise of stable,
preferential market access mobilized key actors in the Mexican political
economy (e.g. non-traditional exporters and firms linked to the growing
export sector) in favour of increased IP. I refer to this process as "activating agnostics" in that we would not expect these actors to have a position one way or the other on patent policy (hence the label "agnostics")
but they become activated in favour of increased IP on account of their
dependence on-and demand for retaining-preferential access to the U.S.
market. Mexico's high level of political trade dependence brought ex5
porters into a coalition of actors pushing for stronger IPRs.1
Did the coalition for expanded IP face opposition? One would expect
a great deal of resistance, internally, to such a fundamental shift in policy.
Indeed, in other developing countries the domestic opposition to implementing TRIPS-style IP reforms was extensive. 1 6 In Mexico, however, the
resistance to the new IP policy was minimal. The principal beneficiaries
of the earlier system, and those that we would expect to resist change,
13. As points of comparison, note that in Argentina and Brazil similar initiatives were
submitted by the countries' presidents to the legislatures at roughly the same time,
but these countries' legislatures took much more active roles and the new IP laws
were not passed until 1996 (and the law passed in Argentina was significantly different from what President Menem had submitted and demanded). See SIIADLEN,
supra note 3.
14. Indeed, in the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations Mexico did not participate in the coalition of developing countries that opposed TRIPS.
15. Kenneth C. Shadlen, Globalisation, Power and Integration: The Political Economy
of Regional and Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Americas, 44 J. oi- Duv. Siruo:. 4
(2008).
16. See SIIAD1_FN, suipra note 3.

828

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

were being wiped out by liberalization. The key factors here include the
abrupt liberalization of the pharmo-chemical sector and unilateral retirement of the investment and technology transfer regulations.
According to the LFPPI and NAFTA, Mexico would offer pharmaceutical patents immediately (i.e. no transition period), and Mexico would
offer "pipeline patents" (i.e. retroactive validation of patents already
granted elsewhere). On these dimensions NAFTA and Mexican policy
exceed the country's obligations under TRIPS, which would have allowed
Mexico until 2005 before granting pharmaceutical patents and makes no
requirement of doing so retroactively via pipeline mechanisms. With regard to compulsory licenses, the provisions in Mexico's 1991 patent law
conformed to the standards that would be stipulated in TRIPS, but did
not exceed TRIPS. 1 7
The principal problem with Mexico's new patent regime is that it is
geared to promote innovation and the commercialization of new knowledge as if the country were much more developed than it is-and therefore
more capable of generating and absorbing inventions at a rapid pace.
One obvious and direct effect of this is evident in the realm of medicine.
Despite significant foreign investment in the sector, the price of medicine
in Mexico remains high.t 8 Most importantly, the government's capacity
to use the tools within the patent system to leverage price reductions
from patent-holding firms is extremely low. Patent-holding pharmaceutical firms do not fear CLs, and thus feel little compulsion to reduce prices.
For example, Abbott prices its patented version of lopinavir/ritonavir, a
key second-line treatment for HJV/AIDS, more than five times higher in
Mexico than in Brazil. 19 Indeed, most key anti-retrovirals (ARVs) are
under patent in Mexico. Among the medicines recommended by the
WHO for first-line treatment, only one (AZT) is off patent in Mexico.
Not only does this mean that the other drugs are more expensive, but not
even generic fixed-dose combinations including AZT can be imported
and distributed in Mexico. The government's own National Center for
HIV/AIDS prevention and control reports that a main obstacle to extending treatment is the "cost of acquiring medicines due to the fact that
Mexico faces the highest prices in Latin America."12 0 The report then
goes on to note that Mexico "'lacks policy instruments to improve the
country's position in negotiating with the pharmaceutical industry and
thus obtain prices that are appropriate for the level of development of the
country."12 1
17. Indeed, the CL provisions of TRIPS and NAFTA are identical. Compare TRIPS
Article 31 and NAFTA Article 1709.10 (http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/nafta/chap171.asp). See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994); see also North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
18. Centro Nacional para la Prevenci6n y Control del VIH/SIDA (CENSIDA), Informe UNGASS Mexic6. at 22. 31 de Enero de 2008.
19. Shadlen, supra note 2, at 52.
20. CENSIDA supra note 18, at 22.
21. Id.
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Not only has the patent system imposed additional costs in the static
sense of yielding high prices, but it has done so without evidently generating the dynamic benefits of increasing local innovation. 2 2 Consider that
the absolute number of patent applications made by residents of Mexico
increased by only four percent in the period since the new patent law was
introduced, from 564 patents in 1991 to 584 in 2005. In contrast, the number of non-residents' applications tripled over the same time period, from
4707 in 1991 to 13,852 in 2005.23 Net licensing and royalty payments
(payments minus receipts) increased from U.S. $341M in 1991 to U.S.

$713M in 2004, an increase of 109%.24 These data suggest that the new
patent system has set incentives to which Mexican actors have minimal
ability to exploit.
The puzzle of patent policy in Mexico is that the response to the mismatches of the previous paragraphs has been to further strengthen IPRs.
Whereas one might expect a country like Mexico to implement reforms
that would ameliorate the effects of patents on drug prices, and which
would facilitate local actors' abilities to participate in the patent system,
instead, Mexico introduced measures to reinforce the effects discussed
above. In short, Mexico adopted a patent system that is inappropriate for
the country's relatively underdeveloped science, technology, and innovation (STI) infrastructure, and it subsequently altered the system in ways
that do not correspond to changes in these underlying conditions. The
next sections turn to the political economy of two episodes of policy
change: a change to the patent law that complicates the process by which
compulsory licenses can be issued, and the rather paralyzed process of
reforms to strengthen the STI infrastructure.
III. COMPULSORY LICENSES AND PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS
Although the affordability of medicine became a prominent issue in
Mexico in the late 1990s, as prices increased significantly above the rate
of inflation in the years following the 1994 devaluation of the peso, the
nature of public sector demand for medicine reduced the government's
sensitivity to such changes. State provision of discounted and free
medicine was far from universal, extending mostly to workers in the for22. Indeed, if the patent system places obstacles to accessing cutting-edge knowledge,
then the costs may be dynamic as well.
23. The data on patent applications are from Red de Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnologia-Iberoamericana e lnteramericana-(RICYT), http://www.ricyt.org/interior/interior.asp?Nivell =2&Nivel2=1 &Idioma-ENG. In making comparisons the key is
to examine growth in patents after new IP laws were introduced. In the six years
after Argentina and Brazil introduced new IP regimes in 1995 and 1996, respectively, residents' patent applications increased by fifty-seven percent in Argentina
and thirty-six percent in Brazil, while in the longer period from introduction of the
new laws until 2005, residents' patent applications increased by fifty-six percent in
Argentina and eighty-eight percent in Brazil.
24. World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2010).
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mal sector and government employees. Nor, importantly, did Mexico's
Secretariat of Health (SSA) face significant obligations with regards to
ARVs, as most HLV/AIDS treatment was provided outside of the state
system and the uninsured generally lacked access.2 5 The result of this
structure of healthcare provision was that high prices did not generate
alarm within the SSA; the Mexican government subsequently lacked a
motive to reform the patent system. 26
Rather than coming from within government, an initiative to reform
patent rules came from a segment of the local pharmaceutical sector that
emerged in the 1990s in response to economic crisis and the limited coverage of the state sector. In the late 1990s and early 2000s a chain of
pharmacies selling non-bioequivalent generics under the mark Similares
(Similars) expanded in low-income areas throughout the country.2 7 The
emergence of Farmacias Similares gave local firms that had traditionally
supplied the state sector opportunities to sell to private pharmacies. The
actors in the chain were closely related, in fact, with the leading producer
of non-bioequivalent generics (Laboratorios Best) owned by the same
person who owned the Farmacias Similares chain, a physician-pharmacist-industrialist-politician named Victor Gonz~ilez Torres, aka "Dr.
SiMi."128
The Similares sector and its allies in Congress spearheaded the initiative to reform the patent system. In December 2002 "Dr. Simi's"
nephew, a Green Party (PVEM) member of the Chamber of Deputies,
presented an initiative that would reform the 1991 LFPPI by reducing
patent terms to ten years in the case of serious health situations. The
PVEM proposal would have violated Mexico's TRIPS and NAFTA requirements for twenty-year patent terms, but instead of rejecting the proposal out of hand, the Science and Technology Commission (CCyT)
modified it. For all of the proposal's faults, its motivations and context
were- not to be ignored: escalating drug prices were making access to
medicines a growing problem, and, as the initiative's authors emphasized,
other developing countries (such as Brazil) were demonstrating the feasibility of health-oriented patent reforms. Thus, the president of the CCyT
acknowledged the concerns expressed by the bill's sponsors and decided
25. See Patricia Uribe Ziifiiga et al., AIDS in Mexico, Tint' Boi:Y, Nov. 1998, available
at http://www.thebody.com/content/artl2264.htm; Sergio Bautista-Arredondo et
al., Costing of Scaling up HI VIA IDS Treatment in Mexico, 50 SALUD PUnt ICO DE
Mr~xico 437, 438 (2008); Mariana Barraza-Llor~ns et al., A dressing Inequity in
Health and Health Care in Mexico, 21 HEALTHi AFFAItts 47, 48 (2002).
26. In contrast, in Brazil, with a fundamentally different structure of government demand, higher prices did create a motive to reform the patent system. See Shadlen,
supra note 2, at 47 (Comparing the Brazilian and Mexican cases).
27. Bioequivalent medicines feature the same active principal ingredients (APIs) as
reference drugs, and they perform identically in the human body. "Similars" may
not satisfy the second criterion.
28. For analysis of FarmaciasSimilares and the Dr. Simi phenomenon, see Coni Hayden, A Generic Solution? Pharmaceuticalsand the Politics of the Similar in Mexico,
48 CURREzNT ANrHRc)oiLoGY 475-95 (2007).
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to rewrite the proposal with proper legal assistance .29 While the original
proposal addressed patent terms (Article 23), the revised bill addressed
CLs (Article 77), an area where Mexico had more discretion under
TRIPS and NAFTA. In March 2003, the CCyT approved a modest reform that would increase the capacity of the SSA to issue CLs in the case
of health emergencies. The key elements were to make a state of "serious illness" declared by the SSA a ground for CLs, to simplify the process
by which "serious illness" is declared, and to assure rapid issue of CLs at
low royalties.
The March 2003 bill drew a sharp reaction from the transnational pharmaceutical industry and its local representatives. Government officials
and legislators found themselves besieged by letters, faxes, emails, phone
calls and personal visits from the transnational sector's trade association
(AMIIF). Mexico's leading law firms, the USTR, and foreign embassies
of countries where the transnational sector is based (e.g. Unites States,
Switzerland).
In fact, the transnational sector did not just react defensively but rather
went on the offensive, converting the threat into an opportunity. AMIIF
attempted to terminate the patent-reform project, though once it was
kept alive by the CCyT, AMIIF and its allies mobilized to secure a reform that would make the granting of CLs less likely than under the 1991
law .30 The campaign was successful, as the transnational sector effectively commandeered the legislative process. The government of Vicente
Fox (2000-2006), never compelled by IP reform in the first place, joined
the counter-offensive: the Secretary of Government's legislative liaison
insisted that the March 2003 version could not proceed and provided the
CCyT with a revised text. 3' This new version, which was passed by the
full Chamber of Deputies and Senate and then signed into law by President Fox in 2004, increases the obstacles to issuing compulsory licenses,
making the process by which "serious illness" can be declared more complicated, removing serious illness per se as a ground for a CL, and requir32
ing high minimum royalty rates.
To make sense of the perverse experience of IP reform in Mexico,
where an initiative to enhance the rights of knowledge-users ended up
strengthening the rights of knowledge-owners, it helps to consider the
changing political economy of the pharmaceutical sector. AMIWF dominates the sector economically and politically. Of course, individual Mexican firms would benefit from reforming the patent system, but outside of
29. Interview with the former President of CCyT, in Mexico City, Mex. (Aug. 10,
2007).
30. Interview with the Director General of AMIIF, in Mexico City, Mex. (Aug. 14,
2007).
31. CCyT archives; interview with a former official in the Secretary of Government, in
Mexico City, Mex. (Aug. 14, 2007).
32. As an illustration of the perversity of this legislative process, note that the original
sponsors of the initiative to reform Mexico's CL system (PVEM) ended up actively
opposing the final bill that was passed in Congress, while the original opponents
(AMIIF and the leading IP law firms) applauded it.
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Farmacias Similares (and its subsidiary firms and suppliers) not even the
local pharmaceutical sector provided support for the favorable version of
the CCyT's initiative or opposed the revised and unfavorable version.
The early-and, with the inclusion of pipeline patents, retroactiveintroduction of pharmaceutical patents transformed Mexico's pharmaceutical sector. Through the mid-1980s, the national pharmaceutical and
pharmo-chemical sectors thrived on reverse-engineering unpatented
drugs and molecules; the extent of backward integration to pharmochemicals gave Mexico a comparatively high degree of self-sufficiency. 33
By the late 1990s, however, trade liberalization had undermined the
pharmo-chemical sector, and patent protection transformed the industrial
structure. The sharp decline of local firms is unmistakable. Mexican
firms account for less than fifteen percent of sales. In fact, nearly twothirds of Mexico's pharmo-chemical firms disappeared from 1987 to 1998
as the sector became subject to import competition and patent
protection. 34
The transformation in industrial structure is reflected in the realm of
politics. Whereas AMIIF and the principal association representing local
firms (CANIFARMA) were antagonists in the earlier episodes of policy
change, by the early 2000s, they were speaking with one voice. Indeed,
the organizations were formally fused, with the president of
CANIFARMA an invited member of AMIIF's board and the
CANIFARMA's two-year presidency alternating between Mexican and
foreign firms. With regard to the pharmo-chemical sector, its representative body consists of a small unit within a broader multi-sectoral industrial chamber of manufacturing industries (CANACINTRA), which itself
experienced dramatic decay in this period.3 5 In short, Mexico's pharmaceutical and pharmo-chemical producers could not articulate positions independent from the transnational sector's position because the local
sector was neither economically nor politically independent.
A potential source of support for the CCyT's initiative was from the
segment of industry that focuses on bioequivalent generics, represented
by the National Pharmaceutical Association (ANAFAM). Yet this organization found itself in stark decline in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with
a shrinking membership. In fact, ANAFAM did not represent a "national" pharmaceutical sector either, as this segment was undergoing
33.

GARY GEREFFI,

TllRD Wolu.t

TIH1

PilARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AN)

DEPENDENCY

IN 1I1IE

226 (1983); Joan Brodovsky, Industria Farmaciutica y Farmo-

quimica Mexicana en el Marco Regulatorio de los Afios Noventa, in JORGE KAI7z
EI AL., APERTURA ECONOMICA v DESREGULACION EN EL MERCADO DE MEDICA-

MENTOS 167-199 (1997).
34. U.N. Comisi6n Econ6mica para Amrica Latina y el Caribe [CEPAL], Las Industrias Farmaceutica y Farmoquimica en Mexico y el Distrito Federal, 49, LC/Mex/
L.400 (24 de Septiembre de 1999); Maria Fabiana Jorge, Efectos de la Globalizaci6n en la Industria Farmocgutica en Mixico, in LA INDUSTRIAL FARMACI-LYFICA
MIXICANA (ANAFAM ed., 2006).

35.

KENNEI-II C. SIIADLEN, DEMOCRATIZATION WITiiour REPRESENTATION:
PoIIcs oF SMALI INDUSTRY IN MExico 116-142 (2004).
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transnationalization of its own, with international generic firms purchasing long-established Mexican firms. ANAFAM's strategy in response to
the CCyT initiative reflects this politically precarious position:
ANAFAM advised CANIFARMA that, despite the likelihood that members of the two organizations would benefit from the proposed reform,
they should lay low and refrain from showing support to avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest. 36 Fighting on two fronts-against AMIIF
and Similares-and politically unstable on account of its own transnationalization, the bioequivalent generics sector was neither in position to lend
its support to the CL initiative, nor to oppose the revised pro-AMIIF
version.
CANIFARMA and ANAFAM's economic and political weakness
meant that AMIIF came to dictate the positions of the "pharmaceutical
industry" on matters of policy. The lone alternative voice came from the
Similares sector-purveyors of non-bioequivalent medicines (which most
countries, including Mexico, are eliminating from the market) and closely
tied to the fringe PVEM. Thus, AMIIF was able to do better than prevent Mexico's patent law from being reformed to simplify CLs. The
transnational sector engineered reforms that strengthen the rights of
knowledge-owners.

IV.

INTEGRATING PATENT POLICY AND
INNOVATION POLICY

In the early 2000s, Mexico, like many other developing countries, began to introduce a set of measures that would broadly modify aspects 3of7
the patent system related to science, technology, and innovation.
Whereas it was the high costs of the patent system (drug prices) that was
the focus of the debate regarding policy changes in the pharmaceutical
area, it was the limited benefits of the patent system (minimal innovative
output) that motivated this latter set of measures.
In 2002, Mexico introduced a new Science and Technology Law that
restructured the National Science and Technology Council (CONACYT),
the government's most important instrument for promoting scientific research, establishing CONACYT as an autonomous body within the Executive branch. 38 The new law, which was reformed on various occasions in
the subsequent years, forms part of a package of measures aimed to
strengthen Mexico's National Innovation System. In particular, the goals
were to improve linkages between university researchers and private
firms, establish incentives for individual researchers in the public sector
36. CCyT archives, (letter on file with author); interview with the ex-President of
ANAFAM, in Mexico City, Mex. (Aug. 21, 2007).
37. Gregory D. Graff, Echoes of Bayh-Dole: A Survey of Intellectual Property and
Technology Transfer Policies in Emerging and Developing Economies, in INTI--LECTUIAI.

PROPERTYv MANAGEIMEFNT IN HI'AL'1 AN!) AGR1ICUI lrUR~AL INNOVABF-s'i PRACTICE-S 169, 180 (A Krattiger et al. eds., 2007),

TION: A HANDBOOK OF

available at http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch03/p03/.
38. Previously, CONACYT was part of the Secretary of Education.
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to collaborate with private firms, provide tax breaks for firms' investments in science and technology, and increase national rates of investment in research and development. Thus, the government introduced
new funding mechanisms that aimed to increase collaboration between
public research institutions and private industry, and the government also
introduced measures that more explicitly involve the private sector in innovation policy. For example, the Fox government created a new consultative forum on science and innovation to link government, academia,
and industry. In fact, key individuals from Mexico's most innovative
firms were essentially poached by CONACYT, with an eye on imparting
the lessons from their successful innovation and IP management.
The overarching framework for the changes implemented during the
Fox administration was the Special Program for Science and Technology
(PECYT), which explicitly emphasized the indispensable role of IP for
developing science and technology. The PECYT was driven by the goal
of increasing the patenting-payoff of public and private spending in the
area of science and technology. The general thrust of the policy effort
was to enhance local actors' incentives to participate in the patent system
as owners and users of knowledge by creating a new regulatory framework to link publicly-funded scientific research with private industry.
Thus, Mexico introduced changes to the system that aimed to tighten
linkages between public sector research and commercial enterprises, and
to encourage licensing of publicly-funded research outputs.
These policy changes are puzzling on a number of dimensions. First,
simply consider how little was actually done. To be sure, if a country
adopts a patent system that assumes a greater degree of scientific and
technological capacity than the country has, a logical response is to try to
strengthen the latter and thereby "grow into" the patent system. Yet, all
the rhetoric notwithstanding, the efforts to strengthen the scientific and
technological base are minimal. For example, Mexico increased expenditures on research and development (R&D) from 0.37% of GDP in 2000
to 0.50% in 2005.39 Among middle-income countries, the global average
in 2005 was 0.94%, while the average of high-income OECD countries
was 2.32%.4o Though the government also made a formal commitment to
increase R&D expenditures to 1.0%, this target has never been met.
Mexico will not "grow into" the TRIPS-and NAFTA-Plus style patent
system without making significant investments in science and technology.
Another way in which this policy trajectory is puzzling is in the sense
that the projected changes to Mexico's NIS amount to effectively reinforcing the regnant patent system by extending more rights of private
ownership over more types of knowledge (i.e. publically-funded research)
and amplifying the role of patenting and licensing as mechanisms to en39. World Bank, supra note 24.
40. Id. The latter figure is most relevant because Mexico has introduced a patent Systern as if the country were a high-income OECD country.
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courage innovation and technology transfer. 4 1 As indicated above, the
response to the 1991 patent law was hardly a burst of innovation and
knowledge diffusion. It seems odd then, that the response would be to
buttress the reliance of establishing and extending private rights of exclusion as tools for disseminating knowledge. Was the problem that the
TRIPS-style regime was not strong enough? What is particularly puzzling
about this is that the strengthening of IP as a response to the low levels of
local innovation came at a time when a considerable body of scholarship
was suggesting that strong IP might be an impediment to innovation in
developing countries. 42
To understand this puzzling policy trajectory it is crucial to look carefully at the underlying political economy of patent policy, particularly
how introduction of the TRIPS-style patent system affected constellations of interests and triggered patterns of mobilization that encouraged
further reform along these dimensions. Quite simply, economic policies,
once implemented, affect the landscape out of which coalitions are
formed for subsequent policies. They do so by weakening the hands of
some actors and strengthening the hands of others (i.e. policy creates
politics).
Let us begin by considering the actors disadvantaged by policy changes.
We can think of two different responses: resist or adjust. Resistance consists of disadvantaged and dissenting actors demanding compensation and
attempting to reverse the policy changes. In terms of adjustment, some
actors may adapt to the new regulations for using knowledge. For example, some actors begin paying license fees to technology owners, while
other actors may disappear (firms that cannot adapt, for example, might
simply close). Although in economic terms it matters how firms adjust, if
they adapt or disappear, in a political sense the differences are outweighed by similarities: in both scenarios the actors who have (or had)
material reasons to oppose policy stop resisting. After all, regardless of
their original disposition toward TRIPS, firms that can adapt to the new
environment do not have incentives to expend resources trying to modify
the new arrangements. Similarly, firms that go out of business do not
present significant resistance. Thus, to the extent that we witness adjust41. In important ways, the model being emulated in Mexico (and throughout the developing world) is the Bayh-Dole Act of the USA (see Graff, supra note 37;
Anthony D. So et Al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from
the U.S. Experience, 6 Puii. LIBRIARY ol Sci. Bioi~ouY 2078, 2082 (2008), available
at http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info /3Adoi / 2Fl0.l371 / 2Fjournal .pbio.
0060262.
42. Richard R. Nelson, The market economy, and the scientific commons, 33 Rv_
SEARCH Poi,'
455-471 (2004); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Public
Research Institutions and Economic Catch-Up, 36:10 RisEARiCII Poi.'Y 1512-1528
(2007); RICIIARD K. LESTER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INNOVATIION: Tim, MISSING
DIMENSION 178 (2004); Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the
Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and
History, in GL OBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTEtLPGI'rUAL PRzotErY Rwirs IN SciENCE ANI) TFCh INOI OGY 19 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993); So et al.,
supra note 41.
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ment, the effect of the new patent rules is to weaken (if not eliminate)
social forces that we might expect to present opposition.
In Mexico, disaffected actors have tended to either adapt or disappear
(i.e. adjust) more than resist: firms and sectors that in the past relied on
easy use of knowledge either devised new business strategies to survive in
the context of the higher cost of knowledge, or they avoided patented
knowledge. The increases in Mexico's outward licensing payments, referred to above, indicate that local actors have internalized the increased
costs of accessing knowledge. A significant decrease in the level of patent
litigation in a context of increased private ownership of knowledge suggests a tendency among local actors to avoid the use of patented knowledge . 43 These two indicators are telling stories that are economically
contradictory but politically consistent. Increases in licensing payments
suggest that actors are using knowledge, but are paying for it, while decreases in relative rates of litigation suggest that actors are not using
knowledge. Politically, the results are the same: actors using knowledge
do not press for change to patent policies because they have integrated
the costs of strengthened JPRs into business strategies. Additionally, actors do not avoid knowledge because IP is no longer a concern. Thus,
within industry and science, we witness little evidence of actors demanding compensation and seeking policy change. Indeed, it is not just a matter of campaigning to modify TRIPS-style IP regimes. Outside of the
shrinking national pharmaceutical and pharmio-chemical sectors, it is rare
to find individuals and representatives in science or industry who even
articulate an argument that reforming the new IP system and reducing
the amount and strength of patent protection may be beneficial.
What about the beneficiaries of the new policy regime? Of course, economic actors who gain an advantage from the policies can accumulate
resources that allow them to push for continuity. This is a process of
increasing returns, whereby certain actors benefit from new policy arrangements, which in turn bestow these actors with resources that allow
44
them to mobilize in support of policy continuity.
In Mexico, however, the signs of this effect are rather faint. Although
the 1991 LFPPI created a "coalition for continuity" that included not just
actual beneficiaries but also potential beneficiaries (e.g. scientists and innovators that envision their futures as patenting individuals or enterprises), it is a rather small coalition. As the figures presented above
43. This observation is based on cross-national data on patent nullification proceedings, considering annual numbers of nullification proceedings relative to the total
number of patent applications filed by residents and non-residents over the course
of the preceding six years. See SIIADIEN, supra note 3.
4.Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
Am. Poi,. Sci. Riv. 251, 254 (2000); Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Post-TRIPS Politics
of Patents in Latin America, in POLiTi-cs 0I-, INT--ELF-rUAL PROPERTY: CONTHSiAUSE. AND) CONTROL oI KNOWLEDGE AND IN[.OR1MAION OVER Till OWNELRSIII
TION (Sebastian Haunss & Kenneth C. Shadlen, eds., 2009); Sivaramjani
Thambisetty, Increasing Returns in the Patent System: Institutional Sources and
Consequences for Law 3 in POITiICS OF7 INTFLLECTUAL PROPE RTY supra.

20101

2010]
PUZZLING POLITICS OF PATENTS87

837

showed, the absolute number of residents' patent applications has hardly
changed since the TRIPS-style patent system was introduced in 1991.
Similarly, data on Mexico's scientific publications does not suggest the
emergence of burgeoning patent-producing scientific community.
What these social changes (or lack thereof) translate to is that the push
for strengthening Mexico's STI infrastructure comes almost entirely from
the state, and within the state bureaucracy those pushing for such changes
find themselves isolated in contestation over scarce public resources. In
contrast to other technologically-proficient developing countries such as
Brazil and India, where local industrial actors were intensely involved in
pushing for a revamping of the STI framework, Mexican industry was
relatively less active .45 Mexico's key industrial-sector associations (e.g.
CCE, CONCAMIN) dedicate minimal attention to IP policy. Even the
Association of Directors for Applied Research and Technological Development (ADIAT), a private-sector association that represents innovative
(or potentially innovative) research-and-development based firms (transnational and national), is exceptionally small and a marginal actor in the
Mexican political economy. The relative thinness of coalitions pushing
for strengthening Mexico's STI infrastructure means that everything
comes from above, and that those state actors that make this a high priority regularly come up against other state actors that have stronger and
more coherent societal allies. In sum, the coalition for investing actively
and aggressively in strengthening Mexico's STI infrastructure is weak.
Indeed, to the extent that industrial actors in Mexico care and mobilize
about STI policy, it tends to be the small group of actors that want to
keep strengthening the amounts and levels of patent protection available.
Few local industrial actors express preferences regarding patents, IP, and
STI policy. What the local firms and associations that do participate in
political debates want now is not weaker IP that might deliver more access to knowledge but more efficient IP systems to support their own
aspirations, plans, and strategies to innovate, patent, and license .46
V.

CONCLUSION

The article has set out to do three things: (1) present, abstractly, a
framework for comparing national patent regimes; (2) show three episodes of change in Mexico's patent system; and (3) explain these changes
by examining the international and national political dynamics of patent
policy. The outcome is that over the course of twenty-five years, Mexico
has adopted a patent regime of questionable appropriateness for its level
of development.
45. Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring
in the 'Technologically Proficient' Developing Countries, in IMPI PM-NI -ING
WIPO's DizVELOPMENT AGENDA 100. 102 (Jeremy De Beer ed.. 2008).
46. To put it differently, the actors at the forefront of political campaigns in the issuearea (e.g. ADIAT) are those that have their own 1P, or at least regard themselves
as potential creators and owners of patentable and excludable knowledge.
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The mismatches I have identified between Mexico's new IP system and
the country's STI infrastructure are not secret. 4 7 One can think of a wide
range of alternative responses but there are few actors who have both the
interest and capacity to push for alternative responses than what we currently witness. The real problem in Mexico is not the constraints imposed
by any external agreements (e.g. NAFI'A, TRIPS), but Mexico's
NAiFTA-plus and TRIPS-plus provisions. These have their own political
and economical roots. NAFTA-and the broader processes of economic
integration that NAFTFA encapsulates-transformed Mexico by eviscerating the coalitions that might push for IP reforms that facilitate the use of
knowledge. But constituencies pushing for more robust STI policies have
not emerged either.
With the political coalitions that would push for alternative IP and STI
policies absent, IP policy and STI policy become dominated by the tiny
group of actors that benefit from the current regime. In a sense, the only
actors left standing after two decades of liberalization and structural
transformation-the only actors that seem to care at all about IP in government and industry-regard more IP and stronger IP as the correct path
and place their energies in pursuing that goal. Rather than either adjusting the patent system to match the country's level of scientific and technological capabilities or doing much to increase the countries level of
scientific and technological capabilities to grow into the new patent regime, Mexico just keeps strengthening the patent system.

47. Jaime Ahoites & Mario Cimoli, Intellectual Property Rights and National Innova-
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